Jun and Kim (2008) consider the optimal pricing and referral strategy of a monopoly that uses a consumer communication network to spread product information. They show that for any …nite referral chain, the optimal policy involves a referral fee that provides strictly positive referral incentives and e¤ective price discrimination among consumers based on their positions in the chain. We revisit this problem to strengthen Jun and Kim's results by weakening their referral condition. Moreover, we characterize the …rst-best policy when individual-speci…c referral fees are available and show that it is qualitatively similar to the second-best solution of Jun and Kim (2008) .
Introduction
Jun and Kim (2008) consider the optimal pricing and referral strategy of a monopoly that uses a consumer referral chain to spread product information. In their model, one …rm sells a product to a …nite chain of n consumers. A consumer who purchases the product can refer it to the immediate successor. Each consumer's willingness-to-pay v is an i.i.d. random variable drawn from a twice continuously di¤erentiable distribution function F (v) over [v; v] with density function f (v). The monopoly …rm can choose a price p and referral fee r that they pay for a successful referral: i.e., a consumer can receive a referral fee if the consumer refers the next-in-line consumer to the product, and that consumer purchases the product.
Consumers need to pay a cost > 0 to make a referral. Consumers make their purchase and referral decisions to maximize their expected utility.
In this model, the last consumer (consumer n) cannot make a referral, her purchase probability is n = 1 F (p), and her purchase and referral of the product do not generate extra sales. The second-to-last consumer's purchase has an externality since her purchase may lead to consumer n's purchase, but the externality is limited only to sales made to her successor. For consumers positioned earlier in the chain, the externality is larger. That is, early buyers are more valuable to the …rm than later buyers since their purchase of the product is necessary for the referral chain to continue, and the potential gains from a longer chain are larger.
With this model, Jun and Kim …rst show that when the second-to-last consumer has a strictly positive referral bene…t, r(1 F (p)) > (their referral condition RC), the earlier a consumer is located in the chain, the higher is her probability of purchasing the product 1 > 2 > ::: > n (their Proposition 1). This result further implies e¤ective price discrimination among consumers according to their positions in the referral chain: although the …rm charges a common price p and pays a referral fee r to all consumers, the …rm e¤ectively discriminates in favor of consumers located earlier in the chain because these consumers obtain a higher expected bene…t from making a referral. 1 Then, Jun and Kim numerically calculate the optimal price and referral fee combinations. Somewhat surprisingly, the optimal product price and referral fee are non-monotonic functions of the chain's length, and referral and production costs and c.
We take a closer look at the optimal strategy of the …rm. When the referral chain is endless (n goes to in…nity), it is easy to show that the …rm's optimal policy generates a stationary outcome (with equal purchase probabilities 1 = 2 = ::: = n ). 2 In the …nite case, since n variables 1 ; :::; n need to be controlled by two policy tools p and r, …nding an optimal choice of (p; r) is a second-best problem, and it can be a highly nonconvex problem with multiple local maxima. This means that although intuitively it may be bene…cial for the …rm to (e¤ectively) price discriminate between consumers based on their positions in a chain, the stationary outcome is another plausible candidate for the optimal solution, especially when n is a large …nite number.
A stationary outcome is characterized by a binding referral condition and no price discrimination. However, Jun and Kim (2008) say nothing about the case where the referral condition is binding: r(1 F (p)) = (or r n = ). 3 It is easy to show that if the refer-1 Consumer k's purchase probability k depends on consumer (k + 1)'s purchase probability k+1 since consumer k takes the expected net bene…t from referral r k+1 into account when she makes her purchase decision: k = 1 F (p + r k+1 )). 2 When there are in…nite consumers in a chain, an indeterminacy problem arises, and there is a continuum of equilibrium strategies (p; r) that support the unique optimal stationary . See Appendix C for details.
3 Jun and Kim (2008) assume that if a consumer is indi¤erent between making and not making a referral, ral condition is binding even for one consumer, then purchase probabilities must be equal 1 = 2 = ::: = n , which also implies that there is no price discrimination among consumers.
In this note, we examine the possibility of stationary outcome being optimal. We allow for referral equilibrium to be consistent with a binding referral condition r(1 F (p)) = by assuming that consumers make referrals when they are indi¤erent between making and not making referrals. We obtain two results that strengthen Jun and Kim's …ndings.
First, we show that the …rm's pro…t can be improved by increasing both p and r in a right proportion starting from the optimal stationary outcome, implying that the stationary outcome is not even a local maximum for any …nite n (Theorem 1). This result strongly justi…es Jun and Kim's analysis, and also implies that at least for large n, the optimal solution is perhaps very close to the stationary outcome. Second, we …nd that when the …rm can charge di¤erent referral fees based on consumers'positions (the …rst-best problem), both the probability of purchase k and the expected referral fee r k k are decreasing as k increases 
Jun and Kim' s Problem
Here we show that the pro…t-maximizing stationary outcome is not a local maximum. Denote by i the probability that consumer i buys the product conditional on being introduced to then she will not make a referral. This tie-breaking rule is convenient since it directly implies that consumers make referrals if and only if there are positive incentives for referral (their Proposition 2). Thus, a stationary outcome is ruled out as it is not compatible with active referrals. Here, we are assuming a tie-breaking rule that allows for referrals to be given in the stationary outcome. We assume that if a consumer is indi¤erent between making and not making a referral, she refers.
it, i = 1; :::; n. The …rm chooses a strategy (p; r) to maximize its pro…tŝ (p; r) = (p r 2 c) 1 + (p r 3 c) 1 2 + :::
where 1 ; :::; n are determined by (p; r) as follows:
:::; n 1.
Denote by P ( ) = D 1 ( ) the standard inverse demand function. We assume that the pro…t function without referrals, (~ ) ~ (P (~ ) c), is concave. Assuming r k for k = 2; :::; n, 1 ; :::; n , are determined by the following system of equations:
and 1 ::: n . Suppose that the referral condition is binding for the kth consumer:
r k+1 = for some k = 1; :::; n 1. Then, P ( k ) = p, and we have P ( 1 ) = P ( 2 ) = ::: = P ( n ) = p and 1 = 2 = ::: = n . This is a stationary outcome, for which consumer referral conditions are all binding: r k+1 = for all k = 1; :::; n 1. We will show that this outcome is not locally optimal.
The …rm's pro…t can be written in terms of k s only:
where ( 1 ; :::; n ) is a solution to system (2) . Under the stationary outcome 1 = ::: = n 1 = n = , the monopoly pro…t when there are n 1 consumers can be written as
where
and ( ) = (P ( ) c).
Denote the optimal stationary policy for an n-consumer chain by (n) arg max ( ; ; :::; ; n).
Theorem 1 states that (n) cannot be a local maximum for small . Theorem 1. The optimal stationary policy (n) is not the optimal policy if ( (n)) > .
For the formal proof, see Appendix A, where we show that the …rm's pro…t is locally improvable (starting from (n)) by choosing an appropriate policy change (dp; dr) 0. It follows from Theorem 1 that the optimal strategy (p; r) is such that the referral condition is not binding for any consumer. This justi…es the tie-breaking rule adopted by Jun and Kim (2008) . As is known from Jun and Kim's (2008) Proposition 1, this implies that the …rm price-discriminates by subsidizing consumer referrals and generating 1 > ::: > n .
We will provide a sketch of the proof of Theorem 1 here. First, in Lemma 1, we investigate the properties of the optimal stationary policy (n). Then, we look at the pro…t function evaluated at the optimal stationary policy 1 = ::: = n 1 = n = (n). We show that there is some M (1 M < n) such that pro…ts increase with purchase probability for consumers located before M and decrease with purchase probability for consumers located after M :
> 0 for all k < M and
. We then show that there exists a policy change d = (dp; dr) 0 such that for any M (1 M < n) the probability of buying increases for consumers located before M and decreases for consumers located after M . We prove this by showing that, starting at 1 = :::
(Lemma 3). Using Lemmas 2 and 3, we conclude that the optimal stationary policy is not a local maximum.
The First-Best Problem
In this section, we consider the same n-consumer model as Jun and Kim (2008) but allow for referral fees to vary along the referral chain. 4 That is, the policy tools are p and r 2 ; :::; r n , where r k is the referral fee that consumer k 1 can get if consumer k purchases the product following her referral. 
where k is consumer k's probability of purchase when she is informed about the product: n = D(p) and k = D(p k+1 r k+1 + ) for all k = 1; :::; n 1.
We can describe the problem in terms of k s only by using
and
for k = 2; :::; n, where P ( ) = D 1 ( ). The …rm's pro…t can be written as
It is easy to see what the optimal probability of buying is for consumer n. Taking the …rst-order condition with respect to n , we obtain
This implies that n = m and P ( n ) is the monopoly price for any n and k = 1; :::; n 1 as long as k > 0. This observation is quite sensible: no matter how many consumers are there, the last consumer does not make a referral, and the …rm should charge the monopoly price for her. The main result we have is the following:
Theorem 2. Suppose m > . For all n, the …rm's optimal policy satis…es 1 > 2 > ::: > n = m , p = P ( m ), and the expected referral bene…ts for consumers 1 through n 1 satisfy 2 r 2 > 3 r 3 > ::: > n r n > 0.
The formal proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix B, but we provide a sketch of the proof here. To prove Theorem 2, we analyze the situation where k consumers are left in the chain, and we solve recursively by backward induction. Let V (k) be the optimal pro…t from the last k consumers, and let (k) be the pro…t-maximizing purchase probability of the kth to last consumer. Since (1) = m , the expected pro…t from the last consumer reached by referral is the simple monopoly pro…t, V (1) = m .
The optimal solutions V (k) and (k) when k consumers are left in the chain can be de…ned recursively:
for all k 2. Proposition 1 in Appendix B shows that the optimal purchase probability for the kth to last consumer (k) is an increasing sequence of k:
all k, assuming the optimal pro…t is increasing with the number of consumers left, i.e.
Under the assumption of increasing pro…t sequence, we can use Proposition 1 to characterize the optimal purchase probability sequence: k = (n k + 1) for any …xed n 2 and all k = 1; :::; n because the kth consumer from the top is the (n k + 1)th consumer from the bottom: i.e., 1 > 2 > ::: > n (Corollary 1 in Appendix B).
Proposition 2 in Appendix B shows that the optimal pro…t sequence V (k) is indeed increasing as long as m > . This proposition is proved by induction. Suppose that V (k) > ::: > V (1). Then, looking at the monopoly problem with k + 1 consumers, we show that the …rm can achieve higher pro…ts V (k + 1) > V (k) if it applies the optimal policy for k to the …rst k consumers and provides consumer k with just enough incentives to make a referral to consumer k + 1 (which is pro…table because m > and consumer k + 1 will face the monopoly price). This proves that V (k) is an increasing sequence. By putting Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 together, we conclude that 1 > 2 > ::: > n = m , which also implies that 2 r 2 > 3 r 3 > ::: > n r n > 0.
Concluding Remarks
In the framework of Jun and Kim (2008) , two qualitatively di¤erent referral equilibria could possibly arise. The one described by Jun and Kim (the non-stationary outcome) is characterized by a nonbinding referral condition, unequal probabilities of purchase, and price discrimination among consumers. The other one (i.e., the stationary outcome) involves a binding referral condition, equal probabilities of purchase, and no price discrimination among consumers. We strengthen Jun and Kim's …ndings by showing that even if we allow for the stationary outcome to arise by adopting a natural tie-breaking rule for referrals, we can show that it cannot be optimal. We also show that the equilibrium in the second-best problem (with a common referral fee) resembles the equilibrium in the …rst-best problem (when the …rm can set referral fees conditional on consumer location in the chain).
Appendix A We prove Theorem 1 by using a sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1.
(i) For all n and all such that ( ) > 0, ( ; ; :::; ; n + 1) > ( ; ; :::; ; n).
(ii) The optimal stationary solution (n) arg max ( ; ; :::; ; n) satis…es the following condition:
Proof. From (4), the di¤erence in pro…ts from (n + 1)-and n-consumer chains is n ( ) ( ; ; :::; ; n + 1) ( ; ; :::; ; n) = n ( ( ) ) :
Hence, n ( ) > 0 if ( ) > 0. This proves (i).
The optimal policy = (n) is implicitly de…ned by the …rst-order condition
This proves (ii).
Finally, using (14),we …nd that at = (n)
The last inequality holds because = n + (n 1) + (n 2) 2 + ::: + n 1 > 0:
holds, and we conclude that (1) > (2) > :::
Notice that the pro…t ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; n ; n) in equation (3) can be de…ned recursively:
( n 1 ; n ; 2) = n 1 (P ( n 1 ) c ) + n 1 ( n ; 1) ( n 2 ; n 1 ; n ; 3) = n 2 (P ( n 2 ) c ) + n 2 ( n 1 ; n ; 2) ( 1 ; 2 ; :::; n ; n) = 1 (P ( 1 ) c ) + 1 ( 2 ; :::; n ; n 1)
Using these formulas, we will prove the following result.
Lemma 2. Suppose that ( (n)) > 0 holds. At 1 = :::
Proof. The marginal pro…ts with respect to buying probabilities 1 ; :::; n are
:::; n ; n 1) :
Note that
( ; 1) = ( (n)) > , and by Lemma 1, ( ; :::; ; k) is increasing in k. Hence, if for some`,
In the following, we will show that for = (n) > 0, there exists M such that
A k ( ) = 1 + + 2 + :::
For k n 1, we have
where ( ; ; :::; ; n k + 1) = A n k+1 ( ) ( ( ) ) + :
Hence,
Plugging in the expression for the optimal 0 ( ) from Lemma 1 and assuming ( (n)) > 0, the inequality is equivalent to
which is equivalent to
Thus, we conclude that
The contents of the brackets is strictly decreasing in k. Note that for k = 1, n n 1 1 1
In Lemma 3, we describe the e¤ects of a policy change (dp; dr) 0 at a stationary outcome 1 = ::: = n = .
Lemma 3. Consider a policy of increasing p and r, starting at 1 = ::: = n = . For any
there is a policy change (dp; dr)
Proof. Totally di¤erentiating equations (2) and evaluating at 1 = ::: = n = , we have:
When p is increasing (dp > 0), we necessarily have d n = 1 P 0 ( ) dp < 0.
Let x r P 0 ( ) > 0. We choose (dp; dr)
= (dp dr) rd M +1 = (dp dr) (1 + x) rxd M +2 = (dp dr) 1 + x + ::: + x n M 1 rx n M 1 d n = (dp dr) 1 + x + ::: + x n M 1 + x n M dp = dp 1 + x + ::: + x n M dr 1 + x + ::: + x n M 1 = 0;
it follows that d M = 0 implies dp = dr 1 + x + :::
Similarly, P 0 ( )d k = dp 1 + x + ::: + x n k dr 1 + x + :::
Using ( 
This inequality holds whenever k < M because 
From Lemmas 2 and 3, we conclude that, assuming ( (n)) > , the optimal stationary outcome (n) is not a local optimum for any …nite n. This proves Theorem 1. and the …rst-order condition for (k) is
The …rst-order condition for (k 1) is
Since M R( ) is decreasing and V (k 2) < V (k 1), we conclude that (k 1) < (k) holds.
4. By an induction argument, we complete the proof.
under the optimal strategy, the probability of purchase declines along the referral chain: i.e., 1 > 2 > ::: > n .
Proof of Corollary 1. If n consumers are left in the chain, then the probability of purchase for the …rst consumer is 1 = (n). If the referral for the second consumer is successful, then n 1 consumers are left in the chain, and the probability of purchase for the second consumer is 2 = (n 1). Similarly, k = (n k + 1) for all k = 1; :::; n. The probability of sales declines along the referral chain (i.e. 1 > 2 > ::: > n ) because Proof of Proposition 2. Note that V (k) is described in the following manner:
where h = (k h+1) for all h. Let's look at the monopoly problem with k +1 consumers.
Consider the following policy for the …rm: set the same purchase probabilities for the …rst k consumers as in the k-consumer problem (i.e., h = h for all h = 1; :::; k) and make the kth consumer just willing to make a referral to the last (k + 1)th consumer (by setting the expected referral bene…t equal to the referral cost: k+1 r k+1 = ). The monopoly pro…t under such a policy is ( k+1 ; 1 ; :::
Note that Q k =1 `i s the unconditional probability that the kth consumer purchases the product, and the …rm pays to let her make a referral. Since the maximum V is achieved with k+1 = m , we have e = max k+1 ( k+1 ; 1 ; :::
if and only if m = m (P ( m ) c) > . Thus, we have e > V (k). Since V (k + 1) e , it follows that V (k + 1) > V (k) whenever m > .
Proof of Theorem 2. From Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we know that 1 > 2 > ::: > n = m and p = P ( n ) = P ( m ). From (8), k r k = p P ( k 1 ) + > 0 for k = 2; :::; n, and since 1 > 2 > ::: > n , we conclude that 2 r 2 > 3 r 3 > ::: > n r n > 0. 
where ( ) = (P ( ) c) and = D (p r + ). Solving the last equality for r, we …nd that r = 1 (p P ( ) + )
The pro…t-maximizing probability of purchase is de…ned by the …rst-order condition 
Note that r is increasing in p: a higher price is associated with a higher referral fee.
